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from a projected 35 million people in year 2000 to 45
million in 2020, an annual increase of 1.4 percent (CA
Dept of Finance website). To meet these demands in
drought years and otherwise, a market mechanism
reallocating only a small percentage of available water
would increase system flexibility, reliability, and
ecosystem protection.

ABSTRACT
Water markets have long been proposed for California
as a water management tool to increase water use
efficiency. Variability of precipitation across time and
space, a fast growing population with strong
environmental concerns, a vocal agricultural sector, and
a powerful service economy combine to create pressure
on limited indigenous water supplies. While continued
investments in conservation are needed to continue to
reduce demand-side pressure, California water
policymakers are seeking innovative market-based
solutions to cooperatively and efficiently allocate water.
So far, California has failed to create the key elements
that would support a dynamic water market. This paper
will review efforts to initiate a water market in
California, provide an update on the state-of-the market,
and suggest some solutions.

Instead of encouraging a dynamic market mentality,
California has continued to rely on hardware fixes to
address the combined pressures of seasonal and annual
variability with population growth. The result has been
massive efforts to control water supplies to the extent
possible through storage and conveyance. The State
Water Project, the federal Central Valley Project, and
numerous regional and local projects have been
constructed to store water when it is available and to
transfer water to where it is needed. By 1980, almost
every viable dam site had been used.
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Now, without a vigorous water market, California has
arrived at a point at which, even with extensive
infrastructure, each of three major water use sectors in
California (agriculture, urban, environment) faces future
water shortages as pressures rise from population
increases, economic growth and implementation of
environmental regulations. If a drought were to occur in
the year 2000, California would likely see the following
effects: Water supply for all uses would decline from
78 maf to 60 maf; urban areas in the San Francisco Bay
Area and the south coast region, including Los Angeles
and San Diego counties, would be vulnerable to 50
percent reductions in supply; agricultural users in the
San Joaquin Valley could face reductions up to 75
percent of their surface water supply; and aquatic
species and riparian habitat would be severely impacted
(DWR p. 3-23; Gleick et. al. 1995).3 While users with a
groundwater supply would have a cushion, no sector
would be left unaffected, repeating the California
experience in the 1987-92 drought. Had California
supported a market mechanism for reallocating a
fraction of available water between willing buyers and
willing sellers, there would now be in place a system to
help address the needs for additional flexibility,
reliability, and ecosystem protection.

The theme of this special issue of Water Resources
Update focuses on trans-boundary water issues.
Although most California water does not cross national
boundaries from source to use, agriculture-to-urban
water transfers do traverse political, social, and
economic borders.1 The progress made in developing a
water market in California may inform efforts in other
basins where similar efforts are ongoing.
CALIFORNIA’S WATER SUPPLY
California’s water supplies are distributed unevenly,
both geographically and temporally. Of the 71 million
acre-feet (maf) of average annual runoff, more than 70
percent occurs in the northern half of the state while
about 75 percent of water demand is in the southern half
of the State (DWR p. 3-2).2 Seventy-five percent of the
State’s average annual precipitation occurs between
November and March (DWR p. 3-5). In addition to
seasonal variability, California is prone to multi-year
droughts, the most recent of which lasted six years from
1987 until 1992 (DWR p. 3-6). Making matters worse,
California’s population is expected to grow quickly
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dependent on farm habitat. To date, these arguments
have been compelling to decisionmakers and have
resulted in the demise of several proposed transfers.

CALIFORNIA WATER MARKET HISTORY
Since the construction of the state’s water conveyance
facilities, the ability for third parties to transfer water
has been constrained by the internally conflicting roles
of the public agencies. The California Department of
Water Resources (DWR), the United States Bureau of
Reclamation (USBR), and the Metropolitan Water
District of Southern California (MWD), are
simultaneously the operators and the regulators of their
respective facilities, the State Water Project, the Central
Valley Project, and Colorado River Aqueduct. The
result is that the agencies allocate capacity in their
pumps and aqueducts in their own interest in order to
retain power for themselves and their contract
constituents through continued control of the facilities
(Easter, et. al. 1998). Additionally, state laws that
mandate open access to conveyance facilities for fair
compensation have not been supported or clarified by
the legislature or the courts.

However, transfers are specific to a particular situation
and can be designed to avoid or mitigate most impacts.
For example, transfers of conserved agricultural water
manage to avoid third party impacts by selling only
water that is made available by increases in efficiency.
Shifting to crops that evapotranspirate less, for example,
reduces consumptive use while maintaining the total
number of acres in production. Such a transaction may
even produce additional environmental benefits by
increasing flow in rivers below the original point of
diversion and secondary economic and community
benefits if the substitute crop is of higher value. While
each water transfer deal is different and should be
evaluated on its own merits, proposed transfers of
conserved water indicate that market participants have
incorporated some third-party impact concerns and have
worked to reduce or minimize those negative impacts.

Water transfers are not new to California. In fact,
transfers within water districts and within project
service areas are commonplace. Individual farmers
have completed over 1,200 transactions within the
Central Valley Project service area (Littleton et. al.
1995). Agricultural districts buy and sell water to each
other on a spot market, usually within the same basin.
Contractors of the State Water Project have executed a
handful of transfers, most between agricultural users
(Littleton et. al. 1995). This evidence illustrates that
transfers do occur, but usually only within the
agricultural sector and rarely the long distances between
different hydrologic basins, which would require the use
of project facilities such as those controlled by DWR,
USBR, and MWD.

While some obstacles have been overcome, high
transaction costs continue to be a major reason for
unsuccessful inter-sectoral deals.
Archibald and
Renwick (1998) group transaction costs into two types:
administratively-induced costs (AICs), which include
marketing-related expenses such as developing
customers and negotiating contracts; and policy-induced
costs (PICs), which include regulatory, permitting, and
compliance costs. They applied this framework to the
California marketplace to analyze potential gains-fromtrade from hypothetical water transfers. Their results
indicate that PICs are preventing inter-district transfers
from occurring and suggest “policies influencing PICs
need to be examined to clarify and perhaps to reduce
these costs if market performance is to be improved.”
Archibald and Renwick’s results mirror the practical
experience of many private water companies in their
efforts to facilitate inter-sectoral transactions. PICs
associated with some transfers can be more than the
value of the entire transaction, making them
economically impracticable.

Market Obstacles: Third Party Impacts and Transaction
Costs
Obstacles to water transfers usually have taken one of
two forms: over-sensitivity to third party impacts and
high transaction costs. Third-party impacts are so
named for the potential impacts on those parties other
than either the buyer or the seller of water. Of most
concern is the reduction in economic or environmental
benefits to the area-of-origin, from which the water is
being transferred. An acre-foot of water transferred
elsewhere, it is argued, will mean one less acre-foot of
water used to grow local crops locally. Hence, the
demand for services to manage crops will be reduced.
Fewer seeds and less fuel for tractors may be purchased
and less farm labor will be required. Less water applied
may also translate into less return flow to other farmers
downstream and possibly less water for species

California Drought Water Bank: Fleeting Success
An example of the regulators’ power is that the only
period in which inter-sectoral and inter-basin transfers
were successful was when the government orchestrated
the California State Emergency Water Bank of 1991. In
a short period, the government-run Water Bank program
developed 800,000 AF of supply from 351 contracts
with agricultural users, with the DWR negotiating with
farmers as a group (Coppock 1994). Water was
purchased at a flat rate of $125 per acre-foot, to prevent
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urban transactions have been negotiated and signed, but
water never actually moved. Three of these transactions
include those between (1) Imperial Irrigation District
and Metropolitan Water District of Southern California;
(2) Palo Verde Irrigation District and MWD; and (3)
Devil’s Den Water District and Castaic Lake Water
Agency (Haddad 2000). These and other uncompleted
agricultural-to-urban transfers form a long historical
chain of unconsummated deals in the California market.
The pressing question is: why, in an environment so
needy for innovative measures of water policy, have
water transfers not succeeded?

sellers from earning excessive profits, and sold to urban
and agricultural users at $175 per acre-foot.4 Water in
excess of demand was stored. The Water Bank was
extended another year, but demand dwindled as winter
rains returned and was closed thereafter.
The Water Bank succeeded in assisting the opening of a
market. In 1991, the fifth consecutive year of drought,
stakeholders dropped many common objections to
large-scale trading, such as objections to fallowing (as a
way of obtaining water for transfer), and cleared the
way for the reduction in transaction costs and
streamlining the regulatory process. To do this, the
Legislature promulgated emergency legislation:
Assembly Bill 9X provided water suppliers the ability to
transfer water outside the supplier’s service area and
Assembly Bill 10X ensured no risk to the supplier’s
water right during the drought (Littleton et. al. 1995).
The Bank showed that under conditions of drought,
political and economic obstructions to large-scale
markets diminish enough to allow agreement.

CURRENT STATE OF THE MARKET
In expectation of a free market created by increased
demand, significant regulatory and institutional reform,
and lower transaction costs, for-profit companies and
environmental organizations have increased their
market activity. Each new entrant adds liquidity in a
market that has long been dominated by powerful public
agencies and monopolistic quasi-public wholesalers.
New entrants promote reform by encouraging retail
users to demand supplier choice and by signaling to
government that large constituencies are depending on a
water market to meet their growing needs.

Closure of the Water Bank: A Market For Emergencies
Only
The Water Bank closed in 1992 for several reasons:
demand dwindled as precipitation increased and studies
found evidence of economic impacts to areas-of-origin
from the practices of fallowing land (Howitt 1994). The
Bank’s demise illustrated that, under the current
regulatory and institutional dynamic, a dynamic
marketplace cannot be sustained. Since 1992, DWR,
the same agency that was able to develop and transfer
800,000 AF under its own program during the drought,
has been unwilling to provide similar access to facilities
at economic rates to third parties. The transaction costs
associated with meeting high access prices and
overcoming these regulatory hurdles have effectively
prevented third parties from completing long-distance
transfers.

For-Profit Companies
For-profit entrants into this marketplace include
Western Water Company (Western), Vidler Water
Company (Vidler), Azurix, and Cadiz Land Company
(Cadiz). The strategy of each of these companies is, in
part, to generate profits from water transfer transactions.
Most importantly, these firms act as catalysts for reform
by sponsoring new legislation and assisting government
agencies in streamlining the transfer process.
Each firm is implementing its strategy in a slightly
different way and across the demand and supply chain.
Unlike other firms that have invested heavily in storage
facilities, Western focuses on water transfer
transactions. In the absence of legal consistency and
clarity, Western engages in transactions that generate
profits and reduce policy-induced transaction costs.
Western completed the first ever privately facilitated
agriculture-to-urban water transfer utilizing publicly
owned conveyance facilities in December 1998 by
wheeling 1,000 acre-feet from a San Joaquin Valley
source to the Santa Margarita Water District in Orange
County. The transfer utilized the State Water Project
and MWD’s conveyance and treatment facilities, paying
full cost, which caused Western to incur a financial loss.
However, the transaction illustrated that profitable
transfers of this kind are possible if only third parties

Despite some optimistic studies, no formal market for
water actually exists in California. Easter, Dinar and
Rosegrant (1998) argue that, despite high transaction
costs, a formal market has developed in California
during the 1990s because of (1) excessive economic and
environmental costs of developing new sources of
supply; and (2) potentially significant gains-from-trade
of transferring existing water supplies (Vaux and Howitt
1984).5 To be sure, California has experienced a growth
in market transactions within agricultural districts and
within sectors. However, completed inter-regional and
inter-sectoral transfers outside of the State Water Bank,
remain elusive with broken deals littering the landscape.
Numerous single seller – single buyer agricultural-to-
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Valley (“Madera . . . Bank”). Azurix intends to bank
surplus flows exported from the Bay-Delta and other
sources in the groundwater basin and sell pumped or
exchange water in dry years to southern California.

were provided access to fairly priced wheeling capacity
in public conveyance facilities.
Western has also helped irrigation districts to make
conservation water available for transfer. To encourage
farmers and agricultural districts to invest in water
conservation methods, the California Water Code
allows water users to retain the rights to the conserved
water and to transfer that water to other users (CA
Water Code). As a result, the transferred water is
defined as beneficially used, thereby increasing the
dominion of the water right and allowing a return on the
water conservation investment. Western’s first success
was the water transfer petition filed jointly with partner
Natomas Central Mutual Water Company, which was
approved by the State Water Resources Control Board
in Order 99-012, issued on December 28, 1999. This
decision and Western’s more recent transfer approvals,
Orders 00-08 and 00-09 of July 10, 2000, have helped
clarify the transfer rules surrounding conserved water
(CA Water Code; State WRCB; Western Wat. 2000).6
With each such successive transaction, Western has
achieved greater clarity of water policy and regulations.
It is unfortunate and sub-optimal that regulatory clarity
can only be gained submitting real transactions through
the regulatory process.

Both the Cadiz and the Azurix groundwater project are
currently undergoing permitting processes, which
prevents the estimation of a completion date.

Water on the Web
In what is becoming a competitive space online, a
number of websites catering to the trading of water
rights have emerged. So far, the number of buyers and
sellers is small, but the potential exists for the Internet
to lower administratively-induced transaction costs by
improving the exchange of information, such as price
discovery through competitive bidding. Azurix has
invested heavily in an online exchange called
Water2Water.com. Azurix announced the creation of
the website in December 1999, and launched it in March
2000. Azurix may have underestimated the complexity
of executing water trades online, and as of June 2000,
no water trades have been completed. Azurix is
revamping its website, which will be devoted to
individual watersheds. A pilot is currently being
developed for a watershed in the state of Texas (White
2000).

While Western is striving to create a market for
transfers in every type of hydrologic year, other
companies have placed bets on wheeling water only in
dry years, when water demand and prices are higher.
To do so, Vidler, Cadiz and Azurix have all invested in
groundwater storage projects in order to store water in
wet years and deliver water in dry years. Vidler has
developed a conjunctive use groundwater storage
project in Arizona utilizing a plan to store Central
Arizona Project water in normal and wet years, and to
sell exchange water in dry years to urban southern
California through the Colorado River Aqueduct
(Schlehuber 1999). Vidler has also purchased space in
the Semitropic Groundwater Storage Project in
California’s San Joaquin Valley, which it hopes to lease
to municipal water districts.

However, Azurix’s experience has not deterred others
from developing more of these so-called business-tobusiness marketplaces.
New entrants seeking to
establish an online water exchange include
WaterRightsMarket.com
of
Littleton,
CO;
WaterBank.com
of
Albuquerque
N.M.,
and
WaterInvestments.com from Group Triton of San
Diego, CA.

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)
Environmental organizations are entering the market
largely as potential lessees of temporary water rights or
purchasers of permanent water rights to protect and
restore riparian habitat and instream fisheries. In
particular, environmental NGOs are motivated to
explore the as-yet unused California Water Code
Section 1707, which allows riparian water rights to be
transferred off the land only for instream environmental
or recreational uses. Environmental Defense and the
Trust for Public Land are in the market to secure water
flows specifically to augment supplies for critical
ecosystems (Suyeyasu 2000). The Rivers Program of
the Trust for Public Land is also evaluating purchases of
additional water flows for fishery restoration and overall

Cadiz Land Company also has extensive underground
storage capacity in San Bernadino County and signed a
50-year agreement to allow MWD to store surplus flows
from its Colorado River rights. In dry years, stored
water would be pumped into the Colorado River
Aqueduct, along with some of the Company’s
indigenous water supplies for delivery into MWD’s
service area (Cadiz Land Co).
Azurix, a publicly traded subsidiary of the international
energy company Enron, acquired in October 1999 the
Madera Ranch groundwater project in San Joaquin
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mechanisms to make California’s water system more
efficient, they should abide by the same ground rules as
all other market players and not skew the system for the
benefit of particular water market participants.

ecosystem health and protection (Holland 2000). These
entrants are too recent to evaluate their potential impact
on a water market, but these ventures from non-profit
organizations are an encouraging sign of an emerging
market. Their participation is also a validation for
environmentalists who have long argued in favor of
markets as an alternative mechanism to government
intervention for the return of much needed flows into
the Bay-Delta ecosystem.

In its effort to acquire additional rights to water in dry
years, MWD released a request for proposals in January
2000. In May 2000, 16 offers were received from
prospective sellers that included water agencies and
landowners. The offers ranged widely in geography,
price as well as in the way water would be made
available. However, by acting as a single buyer, the
agency is stifling the creation of a dynamic market.
MWD is instead using its power over Southern
California’s distribution system to control the water
market, in effect becoming the only practical buyer of
water. The market would be better off if MWD and
other agencies chose a role either as a system operator
or as regulator, but not both.

Governmental Agencies
Several agencies are participating in the California
market in various roles. A recently developed new
approach has been taken by CALFED’s Environmental
Water Account (EWA), which is designed to purchase
water on the market just as any other third party would.
Through extensive computer simulations, EWA can
predict what water quality and fish flows can be
improved significantly with small purchases and
releases during critical periods. CALFED intends to
implement a small-scale version of the EWA during
2000.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR REFORM
In the last two years, there has been a convergence of
opinion that a water market is an important tool for
managing water supply in the future. Governmental
agencies,
non-governmental
environmental
organizations, and for-profit corporations are all in
support of pursuing transfers as a tool. State and federal
agencies publicly support water transfers and, in the
cases of DWR and USBR, are required to facilitate
transfers.
CALFED, the joint state & federal
consortium of agencies working towards a solution for
the Bay-Delta, has promoted water transfers as a key
tool integral to its water supply, water quality and
ecosystem restoration components.

CALFED also is implementing a Water Transfer
Program with a mission to reduce policy-induced
transaction costs, increase conveyance capacity
availability, and improve information sharing Young
2000). “On-Tap”, will be a web-based information
clearinghouse designed to improve information sharing
and will provide a range of valuable services including a
guide to assist parties through the permitting process
and a database of historical and pending water transfers
(CALFED). The database will be particularly useful to
third parties who otherwise would not have access to
up-to-date information about proposed transactions that
may impact their livelihoods. DWR, USBR and State
Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB) will manage
the clearinghouse collectively. The clearinghouse is a
start, but agencies need to continue to drastically reduce
PICs in new ways.

Advocates of water marketing in California hope that
continued interest in markets and the increasing need for
efficient water allocations will result in necessary
improvements in market performance. An excellent
start would be the adoption of the specific reforms
recommended in the recently published California
Legislative Analyst’s Office report on water transfers
(Hill 1999).
The recommendations, focusing on
clarifying laws and procedures, echo Archibald and
Renwick’s analysis advocating a reduction in policyinduced transaction costs to increase market
performance. Most important are the lack of a clear,
consistent statutory policy and to make available
capacity in publicly owned conveyance facilities for a
fair price. Without clarity, parties must an inordinate
amount of time and money to achieve regulatory
approvals. Without fairly priced and available capacity,
long-distance transfers will remain economically
infeasible.

Unfortunately, some agencies have chosen other roles
that may hurt rather than help the market. For example,
the United States Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) is
allocating $10 million during 2000 to purchase water to
supplement water deliveries to agricultural contractors
of the Central Valley Project who are receiving less than
their maximum annual allotments. While Central
Valley farmers are not undeserving of efforts by USBR
to fulfill their contractual obligations, the $10 million
allocation acts as a government subsidy to contractors
and distorts the water market for all other participants.
If government agencies are looking to market
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Figure 1: Analysis of California Water Transfer Market by Legislative Analyst’s Office (Hill 1999)
Problems

Recommendations

Lack of Clear, Consistent Statutory Policy

Consolidate Water Transfer Law Into Single Act

Lack of Information About Transfers and Their
Impacts

Establish Water Transfer Information Office

Uncertain Water Rights

Consolidate and Clarify Statutory Protection of Water
Rights When a Transfer Takes Place

Infrastructure Constraints

Distribute Forecasts of Available Capacity in Public
Conveyance Facilities; and Clarify Statutory Definition
of “Fair Compensation” to Be Paid for Use of Public
Conveyance Facilities
Establish Water Transfer Information Office to
Facilitate Transfers
Assess Water Transfer Fee to Fund Appropriate State
Agency Review; Establish Statutory Criteria for
Consistent and Comprehensive Protection; Utilize
Water Transfer Information Office for Impact
Evaluation and Information Disclosure

Transaction Costs Could Be Lower
Inadequate Third-Party Protection

cover a portion of the fixed cost. However, facility
owners have real concerns about transfers jeopardizing
their financial integrity by displacing current sales. But
the increased use of excess capacity in existing pipelines
at marginal prices would increase new sources of supply
to a region in long-term shortage. So far, MWD and
others have successfully prevented SB 506 from
passing.

Legislative And Legal Solutions
Recent California water policy has not been without
attempts at additional clarity in water transfer laws and
regulations. Recent developments include Senate Bill
970, introduced by Senator Jim Costa (D-Fresno),
which Governor Gray Davis signing into law. This bill,
“The Water Rights Protection and Expedited ShortTerm Water Transfer Act of 1999,” facilitates shortterm transfers by amending existing statutes. The law
grants rights to water purchasers in State Water
Resource Control Board proceedings, and it qualifies
water made available from temporary land fallowing as
a conservation effort and protects water transferred as a
beneficial use. The combined effect will be support for
a short-term spot market by providing farms the ability
to sell into the market on an annual basis, thereby
allowing the market to react more closely with
hydrologic conditions. At the same time, the law
recognizes and minimizes third party impacts by
limiting fallowing for transfers to one year.

The Legislature is not only tackling conveyance costs
directly with SB 506, but is also addressing the lack of
oversight of MWD’s rate setting through Senate Bill
1973.8 Under the Metropolitan Water District Act, the
only body with current authority over MWD is the
legislature itself. SB 1973 would obligate the California
Public Utilities Commission to oversee the rate setting
of conveyance by MWD, and to determine the fairness
of the rates.
The California courts had an opportunity to reform the
way system owners charge for conveyance through its
consideration of MWD’s so-called “validation action.”
In 1997, MWD sought to solidify its system-wide
pricing for wheeling water to prevent new entrants into
the southern California market. In January 1998, in
what became a fleeting victory for market proponents,
the trial court decided against MWD calling the systemwide charge unfair to competition and proposed a fee
structure for wheeling based on incremental costs (CA .
. . Reporter 1999). This decision would have allowed
third parties the ability to convey water through existing

The Legislature should pass Senate Bill 506, which
addresses the inordinately high cost of conveyance
through publicly owned conveyance systems.7 SB 506
is intended to amend the 1986 Katz Wheeling Statutes
(California Water Code Section 1810-1814) so that third
parties will be charged fair compensation for access to
publicly owned conveyance facilities. This amount
would be an incremental, or marginal, fee based on the
portion of the system that is used, plus some charge to
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pipelines at much less expensive rates and provide for
additional competition and choice of suppliers to
municipal water districts. It would also have allowed
the Katz wheeling statutes to be used in the manner they
were intended. Instead, MWD appealed this decision to
the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate
District, which overturned the lower court’s ruling. The
appellate court determined that the wheeling statutes do
not prevent owners from including system-wide costs,
and, moreover, that “the Legislature did not intend that
the impact of the Wheeling Statutes should be to cause a
water conveyance facility owner to lose money or to
subsidize wheeling transfers” (Metropolitan . . .
District). The result is that the state’s judicial branch of
government is unwilling to enforce the Katz wheeling
statute, instead forcing the legislature to clarify and
strengthen the Katz statutes as needed.9

supplies and conveyance capacity. Indeed, policyinduced transactions costs must be lower and
government agencies must limit their role to either
regulators or facility owners/operators. Market reform
can pay enormous future dividends for California by
ensuring economic growth, restoring aquatic habitat,
and protecting the state’s famed quality of life. But
without drastic change, entrepreneurial companies will
disappear and cease to be an agent of change. Without
them, the opportunity for a water market will wane for
the foreseeable future. When others evaluate the
potential to generate revenue in California from water
transfers, they will undoubtedly look at the enormous
amount of time and money expended by companies, and
look for opportunities elsewhere. Without significant
reform now, California’s dream of efficient, marketbased water reallocation will remain a mirage.

Colorado River Basin: A Market in Hibernation

AUTHOR

At the federal government’s urging, California’s rights
holders of Colorado River water signed an historic
agreement in October 1999 (Key Terms . . . 1999). The
agreement represents a plan for these parties to reduce
their diversion of water down to their Colorado River
Compact allotment 4.4 maf per year, from current
diversions of 5.3 maf. This agreement has positive and
negative aspects for the market. MWD has won reoperation of Colorado River reservoirs, and while this
provides additional reliability to its customers, MWD
will also be able to keep the Aqueduct full through the
year 2015, resulting in very little availability of excess
capacity to third parties. This ensures that third parties
will have no feasible way to transfer water to urban
Southern California from any other water rights holder
in the Colorado River basin for another 15 years. On
the other hand, the Agreement makes provisions for the
1998 water transfer contract between the Imperial
Irrigation District and San Diego County Water
Authority. The contract calls for the transfer up to
200,000 acre-feet per year of conserved agricultural
water to San Diego. The transaction, if consummated,
would mark the largest single transfer of water from
agriculture-to-urban use and would represent a large
step forward in establishing a free market in California.

Peter L. Yolles was, until August 2000, Regional Vice
President for Western Water Company in Point
Richmond, CA, a firm that develops and markets water
supplies in California. Mr. Yolles holds a Master of
Business Administration and a Master of Environmental
Studies from Yale University. He can be reached by email at peter.yolles@aya.yale.edu.
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1

California’s water supply is international to the extent
that California has rights to 4.4 million acre-feet of the
annual flow of the Colorado River, which eventually
runs south into Mexico.

Howitt, Richard E. 1994. “Effects of Water Marketing
on the Farm Economy.” In H.O. Carter, H.J. Vaux,
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2
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